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The Mention of Insurance at the Voir Dire or
During the Trial in Ohio
IN GENERAL
It may be laid down as a general rule that evidence that a
defendant in a personal injury or wrongful death action carries
casualty insurance protecting him from liability to third persons
on account of his own negligence is inadmissable, technically be-
cause such evidence is irrelevant.1 The prejudicial character of such
testimony leads courts to be most strict in guarding against it. How-
ever the court may allow insurance to enter where it will assist in
proving a material issue.2 This aspect of the problem will be dis-
cussed in the latter part of this comment.
The issue of insurance can be injected into the trial at any stage
from the voir dire to the closing argument. If not done by counsel in
good faith to prove a material issue in the case it will almost in-
variably be held prejudicial error on appeal. 3 The question of the
actual effect of insurance company defendants on jurors has been
the subject of much discussion. While it is generally agreed that if
such fact is known to the jury it will influence the amount of the
judgment,4 one commentator after a study of Franklin County juries
suggests that it may be without weight to the jurors or go unnoticed
altogether.5 Another writer with evident unbounded faith in the
jury system firmly believes the mention of insurance is prejudicial
to the side raising the issue as the jury will realize what counsel is
frying to do and react accordingly.6
The few cases where appellate courts did not reverse the trial
court judgment after plaintiff's attorney inserted the issue, had other
strong factors in favor of affirmance. The upper court will not find
reversible error where the court is unable to find a different verdict
would have been returned without the insurance issue.7 A question
by plaintiff's attorney to defendant, "Has not your insurance been
1 17 O.uo JuR. 316; see exhaustive annotations 56 A.L.R. 1418, 74 A.L.R. 849,
95 A.L.R. 388, 105 A.L.R. 1319; O'TooLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 197 (2nd Ed. 1937); WIGDIoRE, EVIDENCE Sec. 282a (3rd Ed. 1940).
2 17 Omo JuR. 217.
3 Schnidt v. Schalm, 2 Ohio App. 268 (1913); Messinger v. Karg, 48 Ohio
App. 244 (1934); Enirick v. Penna. Rd. Y.M.CA., 69 Ohio App. 353 (1942).
4 11 U. of Cin. L. REV. 153 et. seq.
S Hunter, Law in the Jury Room, 2 OHIO ST. L. J. 15.
615 NEB. L. REV. 327.
7 Knutzen Motor Trucking Co. v. Steiner, 31 Ohio App. 46, 166 N.E. 243
(1928), an admission by plaintiff on questioning that a report had been made
to the insurance company.
cancelled as a result of this accident?" was objected to and sus-
tained.8 The reviewing court said this question did not fall in the
category of prejudicial material in attempting to show there is an
insurance policy to indemnify litigant against loss, hence there was
no misconduct of counsel. In an action against a taxicab company
plaintiff's counsel was permitted over objection to examine one of
the defendant's witnesses concerning the company's relation with
an insurance company and to elicit the fact that defendants were in-
sured." The court reached the result by noting the fact that in that
city taxies were required to carry insurance. However perhaps
more importanb was the fact that the case was tried before the court
and not to the jury. The case which perhaps went the furthest in
holding such questions not error was Yellow Cab v. Kackloudis.'0
There plaintiff's counsel mentioned there was an insurance company
involved when in fact no such company was interested. Held by the
reviewing court as cured where the court directed the jury not to
pay any attention to such statements, explaining they were improper
and the attorney apologized and withdrew his remarks.
The Kackloudis case is against the weight of authority in Ohio.
The attitude of courts generally is that where counsel is guilty of
such misconduct the mere sustaining of objections or admonishing
the jury to disregard the statements is not sufficient to free the case
from the possibility of prejudice." Even where the plaintiff's case
is clear the verdict will be set aside as excessive by the reviewing
court where it is apparent the jury was influenced by repeated at-
tempts of counsel to inject the issue of insurance into the trial.' 2
One Ohio court of appeals held so closely to this rule that they
reversed the lower court where counsel for the plaintiff in question-
ing a doctor asked him if he testified often in cases for "insur- for
various defendants."' 3
The converse of the proposition is also true. The defendant may
not dwell on his poor financial position and give the jury information
that he personally would have to pay a judgment.' 4 Nor may a cor-
porate defendant inform the jury that the company does not carry
liability insurance and that the stockholders would be forced to
pay.'3
S Backman v. Ambos, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 97, 79 N.E. 2d 177 (C. of A. 1947).
9 Shadwick v. Hills Cab Co., 79 Ohio App. 143, 69 N.E. 2d 197 (1946).
10 29 Ohio App. 438, 163 N.E. 633 (1928).
11 Wilson v. Wesler, 27 Ohio App. 386, 160 N.E. 863 (1927); Mowery v. Wile-
man, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 172 (C. of A. 1936).
12 Bliss v. Harnett, 48 Ohio App. 156, 192 N.E. 818 (1933).
13 Contract Cartage Co. v. Kern, 55 Ohio App. 481, 9 NE. 2d 869 (1935).
14 Maggio v. Cleveland, 151 Ohio St. 136, 84 N.E. 2d 912 (1946).
Is Hatsio v. Red Cab Co., 77 Ohio App. 301, 67 N.E. 2d 513 (1945).
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The casualty companies are further protected by the courts in
that communications between insured and insurer are held privi-
leged under Ohio General Code Section 11494.16 A statement made
by an insured defendant to his insurance agent for the purpose of
communicating it to his attorney is privileged where the agent was
examined on deposition.17 A report from the insured to the insurer
concerning a casualty becomes the property of the insurer and sub-
ject to its complete control; and, when the insurer transmits it to its
attorney for the purpose of preparing a defense against a possible
lawsuit growing out of the accident it is again a communication from
client to attorney and privileged.1 8
This general rule that the mention of an insurance company
should not be injected into the trial is subject to two main ex-
ceptions. The first that counsel for plaintiff is permitted to question
prospective jurors on the voir dire examination concerning possible
connections with liability companies and the second under the
general rule that evidence competent on one issue will not be re-
jected because it contains some element that otherwise would be
inadmissible.
Vom DmE
In 1927 the Supreme Court of Ohio in Pavilonis v. Valentine
held that it was not error to permit the examination of a prospective
juror as to his connection with or interest in a casualty insurance
company where such a company is directly or indirectly interested
in the result of the trial.' 9 In doing so they rejected former Ohio
decisions2" and brought this state in line with the majority view in
this country.2 1 The majority reasoned that the claim that this would
influence the jury shows "a contempt of the jury system, as to
lead us to believe that jurors, in violation of their oaths, render
verdicts pro and con according to their suspicions." This argument
seems of doubtful validity in view of the attitude of courts generally
in protecting against any mention of insurance at the trial level.
Marshall, Chief Justice, dissented on the grounds that where it was
not apparent to the jurors that an insurance company was conduct-
ing the defense this was a patent effort to apprise their minds of that
fact and create whatever bias might naturally follow. He questioned
the majority contention that it was fairly common knowledge that
drivers carry casualty insurance and stated that only 14% of Ohio
16 Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N2E. 276 (1906).
1 7 In re Heile, 65 Ohio App. 45, 29 N.E. 2d 175 (1939).
IS In re Kleman, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E. 2d 492 (1936); Ex parte Schoepf,
74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906).
19 120 Ohio St. 154, 165 N.E. 730 (1929).
20 Schnidt v. Schalm, 20 C.C. (N.S.) 99 (C. of A. 1913).
2156 A.L.R. 1418, 74 A.L.R. 849, 95 AL.R. 388, 105 A.L.R. 1319.
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motorists carried such insurance in 1925. The Pavilonis case was
questioned soon afterwards in the same court22 and was overruled
just five years later in Vega v. Evans.23 There the court said, "Bub
if it is not revealed that the defendant has an insurance contract,
whab difference could it make that some juror is interested in in-
surance." The opinion concluded by holding the probability of evils
was more remote where counsel is not permitted to so question
jurors. The Vega case lasted just two years till it was overruled in
Dowd-Feder Inc. v. Truesdell which reinstated the Pavilonis de-
cision.24 One restriction was appended however to the Pavilonis case,
that is that all questions must be propounded during the voir dire
examination in good faith. Moreover they established a procedure to
be followed in the examination. The general question of whether
the juror has or has had any connection with or interest in a casualty
company must be asked first. If the answer be in the affirmative, the
juror may then be asked the name of such company and the nature
of his connection with or interest therein.25
It would seem that the "interminable controversy" was finally
settled. The supreme court later held it was the duty of the trial
court in all cases to require counsel to put the questions in such a
way as to be in accordance with orderly procedure.26 Just what con-
stitutes good faith and what is orderly procedure have of course
been the problems. The following questions have been held to be
within the scope of proper examination:
1. Are any of you financially interested in any company writing
idemnity or public liability insurance? 27
2. Are any of you, or is anyone in your immediate family en-
gaged in any way in the business of indemnity insurance or
public liability insurance? 28
3. Is there anyone in your immediate family connected with
the adjustment or claim department of any public liability or
indemnity insurance company? 29
4. Do any of you know this man? (Pointing to agent of insuring
defendant) .30
It has been held reversible error where counsel for plaintiff
asked members of the jury if any were stockholders or employees
of a certain named casualty insurance company not a party to the
22 Fromson and Davis Co. v. Reider, 127 Ohio St. 564, 189 NE. 851 (1934).
23 128 Ohio St. 535, 191 N.E. 757 (1934).
24 130 Ohio St. 530, 200 N.E. 762 (1936).
25 Id. para. 2 of the syllabus.
26 Morrow v. Hume, 131 Ohio St. 319, 3 NXE. 2d 39 (1936).
2 7 Salerno v. Oppman, 52 Ohio App. 416, 3 N.. 2d 801 (1936).
2S Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Greenawalt v. Yuhas, 83 Ohio App. 426, 84 N.E. 2d 221 (1947).
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suit-no juror having indicated any interest in such company.3 1 It
must be remembered that any specific questions can only come after
an affirmative answer by one or more jurors to the general question
of interest. If the answer is a unanimous negative the examination is
concluded in that respect.3 2 If counsel does not examine jurors in
this respect he will be held to have waived the privilege to chal-
lenge.33
The effect of a failure on the part of a juror to answer these
questions truthfully has also been interpreted differently by Ohio
Courts of Appeals. In an action for personal injuries, where it is
claimed that a juror's husband had an interest in an automobile in-
surance agency, the reviewing court cannot say there was not a jury
of twelve qualified persons, where affadavits for and against new
trial therefore conflicted and the trial court found no prejudicial
error.34 However the majority of the decisions hold the plaintiff is
prejudiced where jurors withhold pertinent information on similar
grounds. Such as where a juror withheld he had once worked for a
detective agency and settled claims,3 5 where a juror conceals the
fact he has previously presented accident claims,3 6 where a juror re-
mains silent when asked if any of them have previously presented
claims for personal injuries, 7 or where a juror remains silent to a
similar question and claims forgetfulness."8
Various solutions to this dilemma have been presented. The best
of which in the writer's opinion is that made by Judge Marshall dis-
senting in Pavilonis v. Valentine. His suggestion was that all jurors
on the panel be required to fill out a questionnaire, including therein
all necessary questions as to possible connections with insurance
companies. This practice has already been adopted in some juris-
dictions.39 The idea has found favor with other writers40 and would
seem to eliminate the objections to either position. In that, it would
bring out any connection with insurance companies and still avoid
the mention of the subject at the actual trial.
Other possible solutions are aimed usually at stricter financial
responsibility laws or following the example of Massachusetts in
31 Yates v. Irvin, 85 Ohio App. 164, 85 N.E. 2d 404 (1948).
32 Ensign v. New York Life Ins. Co., 26 Ohio L. Abs. 281 (C. of A. 1937).
33 Conrad v. Kirby, 66 Ohio App. 359, 31 N.E. 2d 168 (1940).
34 Faucett v. Hensley, 35 Ohio App. 16, 171 N.E. 352 (1929).
35 Petro v. Donner, 137 Ohio St. 168, 28 N.E. 2d 503 (1940).
3 6 Pearson v. Gardner Cartage Co., 148 Ohio St. 425, 76 N.E. 2d 67 (1947).
37 Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Myers, 50 Ohio App. 224, 197 N.E. 803 (1935).
38 Maggio v. Cleveland, 151 Ohio St. 136, 84 N.E. 2d 912 (1949). The court
here suggests that the trial court put the jurors under oath before their exami-
nation.
39 See Note, 43 McH. L. REv. 623.
40 10 U. of CnT. L. REv. 315, 11 U. of Cni. L. REv. 157.
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compulsory insurance. This however is subject to the objection that
insurance rates will invariably increase in Ohio. In Massachusetts
with compulsory insurance, rates rose 22.7% in twelve years despite
the exclusion of guests from the statute in the interim.4 There is
also the possibility of a statute similar to that of Wisconsin which
forces the insurance company to join and tell the amount of their
interest.42 This too has resulted in higher insurance rates, Wisconsin
rates after this legislation rose fifty per cent more than adjoining
Minnesota's and forty one per cent more than Ohio's.43
It is suggested that a system whereby the defendant would be
permitted to inform the jury as to the extent of his coverage once
the issue of insurance has been raised either on the voir dire or later
in the trial would accomplish the purpose desired.
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
In Goz v. Tenney44 the Ohio Supreme Courb established the
rule that a statement to an insurance company is relevant evidence
where it shows defendant's liability on the grounds that it is a
declaration against interest. The fact that the statement is made to
an insurance company furnishes no immunity from the general rule.
It might perhaps be more properly called an admission of a party
opponent.4
5
This rule has been followed repeatedly in Ohio courts. Where
the defendant denied ownership of the automobile and operation of it
but told a witness he didn't care about the accident as he carried
insurance the court held it admissible 46 following Goz v. Tenney.
Cross-examination of defendant as to any statements made by her
to an insurance company, or to her attorneys, as to the speed of her
automobile was not error.4 7 Conversations are not rendered in-
competent for the sole reason that the parties discussed liability in-
surance.48 In a later case the rule was tightened by adding "it is not
prejudicial in the absence of some unnecessary act or comment by
counsel or witness. '49 In that case the conversation went, "What are
you going to do about this car?" Defendant answered, "I will notify
the insurance people tomorrow." It is open to question whether such
4 1 FiNAciAL REsroNsIBInri iN MOTOR AccruExs 22 (Illinois Legislative
Council, Pub. 41, 1941). This pamphlet is suggested for a comprehensive study
of this problem.
42 WIs. STAT. §260.11 (1931).
43 2 Oro ST. L. J. 318.
44 104 Ohio St. 500, 136 N.E. 215 (1922).
4S WIGIOaR, EvmENcE, Sec. 1048 (3rd. Ed. 1940).
4 6 Wicker v. Kenney, 19 Ohio App. 346 (1924).
47 Lindeman v. Eyrich, 21 Ohio App. 314 (1926).
4 8 Frank v. Corcoran, 25 Ohio App. 356, 158 N.E. 501 (1926).
49IIal v. Gayes, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 267 (C. of A. 1927).
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a statement is either an admission or a declaration against interest
at the time made.
The extent of the doctrine was further clarified in Humphreys
v. Madden.5" There defendant told the doctor in the hospital that he
would see plaintiff received proper care and he would see that his
insurance took care of it. The defendant objected to such testimony
and asked for a mistrial. The Court of Appeals said that if there
was nothing more it would be prejudicial but overruled the mistrial
motion as defendant had finished sentence "for I guess I am to
blame." This case seems more correct than some of the earlier ones.
The mere fact that the defendant states he is going to report the
accident to the insurance company is no evidence of liability but
simply a requirement of most insurance contracts.
AGENcY
The other ground where the fact of insurance may properly be
introduced during the trial is to prove a master-servant relation-
ship. It is generally accepted that where an action is predicated on
the doctrine of respondeat superior, and defendant denies that he
was in fact the master, evidence that he carries insurance for injuries
to an alleged servant is admissable, for it has some relevant bearing
on the fact of whether or not he was the master.5'
While such evidence is entirely material, relevant, and com-
petent to be considered in a determination of the relationships, it
must be admitted expressly for that purpose,52 and the charge of
the court should explicitly state that the jury should examine the
evidence in this light only.5 3 An application and permit to operate
a motor truck upon the highways of a foreign state are competent
evidence to show relationship between the driver and the owner of
a truck on the issue of agency, notwithstanding the fact it also
advises the jury that the defendant possesses protective insurance.5 4
Or where the plaintiff has offered an insurance policy to prove one
of the defendant's relationship and the plaintiff was later forced to
elect and this defendant was dismissed, the evidence is no longer
competent and its withdrawal from the jury with appropriate in-
structions does not constitute error.55
50 68 N.E. 2d 562 (1943).
51 Jox-as, EvmFEcE 282 (4th Ed. 1938); Hoover v. Turner, 42 Ohio App.
528, 182 N.E. 598 (1931); Cushman Motor Delivery v. Smith, 51 Ohio App. 421,
1 N.E. 2d 628 (1935); Kraemer v. Bates Motor Transport, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 262
(1937).
52 Leonard v. Kreider, 51 Ohio App. 474, 1 N.E. 2d 956 (1935).
S3 Campbell v. Koerner, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 441 (C. of A. 1935).
S4 Cushman Motor Delivery v. Bernick, 55 Ohio App. 31, 8 N.E. 2d 446
(1936).




It would be quite unfair to the plaintiff in a personal injury
case to penalize him by forcing a new trial where insurance comes
into the case accidentally from one of his witnesses. Ohio courts
have recognized this and have held that where insurance was men-
tioned inadvertently and counsel did every thing possible to avoid
further mention of it there is no error." It is advisable however that
the plaintiff move to have such reference stricken from the record.57
CONCLUSION
The rule in Ohio as to the admissibility of references to defen-
dant's insurance is on the whole a rigid one. The use of the word in-
surance in a negligence action will be grounds for a new trial even
where the jury has been instructed to disregard the reference.58
It would seem however that the effect of this strictness is greatly
lessoned by theopportunityto stress the issue on voir dire.A solution
to this problem would greatly strengthen the evidenced purpose of
the Ohio courts.
To summarize it may be said:
(1) As a general rule any reference to insurance in a person-
al injury suit at the trial level is improper; violation of the rule
where the defendant may have been prejudiced will result in a
new trial even though the jury has been instructed to disregard the
evidence;
(2) Prospective jurors may be examined on the voir dire as
to any interest in a casualty insurance company; specific questions
may be asked if one or more jurors answer the general question in
the affirmative;
(3) Relevant evidence will not be excluded as prejudicial
where it contains an insurance reference; the best example being
declarations against interest or an admission of a party opponent;
(4) Evidence to prove a master-servant relationship is prop-
erly admissible notwithstanding the fact it also informs the jury
of defendant's insurance;
(5) Inadvertent reference by a witness to the issue of insur-
ance not solicited by the plaintiff will not be grounds for reversal.
John A. Brown
s6 Stevens v. Lepley, 46 Ohio App. 445, 189 N.E. 260 (1933); McAdams v.
Blosser, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 92 (1938); Henderson v. Daniels, 67 Ohio Ohio App.
380, 36 N.E. 2d 876 (1940).
57 Bellar v. Cenci, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 1 (C. of A. 1939).
SsWilson v. Wesler, 27 Ohio App. 386, 160 N.E. 863 (1927); Mowery v.
Wileman, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 172 (C. of A. 1936).
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